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DO WE NEED A HYBRID LAW OF CONTRACT?
WHY HUGH COLLINS IS WRONG AND WHY IT
MATTERS
JOHN GAVA AND JANEY GREENE*
INTRODUCTION
IN Regulating Contracts1 Hugh Collins takes up the challenge
presented by 40 years of empirical studies which show that business
people make little use of contract law in settling disputes, preferring
instead to rely on trust and various non-legal sanctions to organise
their transactions. Indeed, business parties often actively avoid the
use of law because of its expense, inconvenience and tendency to
harm business relationships. These ﬁndings pose a challenge to
traditional doctrinal scholars. If business parties do not make much
use of contract law, one has to ask what role it does play and
whether the attention that is paid to it by orthodox legal scholars is
misplaced. Regulating Contracts takes on this challenge directly and
is the most substantial attempt made so far to explain the role of
contract law in light of the questions raised as to its usefulness.2
Collins’ argument addresses the apparent slippage between the
orthodox view of contract law as central to market exchanges and
the empirical ﬁndings that suggest that contract law is only of
minor importance and may even be an impediment to market
activity. He regards the relatively minor use of contract law in the
market as a problem because this means that contract law is not a
useful tool to governments in their task of regulating markets. He
proposes to address this problem by reconﬁguring contract law so
that it supports commerce. This reconﬁguration will take the form
of a ‘‘hybrid’’ comprising the ‘‘discourses’’ of law, economics and
the sociology of business. This paper will argue that Collins’
argument for a hybrid contract law is not convincing, that in fact it
pursues a strategy which is at odds with his own carefully
* University of Adelaide. We would like to thank David Campbell, Peter Cane, Frank Carrigan,
Jeannie Paterson and Eric Posner for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.
1 H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford 1999).
2 The bibliography contained in Collins’ book contains a comprehensive listing of the major
empirical studies of contracting practice and much of interest covering other areas of contract
as well. Collins’ more recent work in this area builds on the ideas developed in Regulating
Contracts and these will be considered when appropriate; but it is Regulating Contracts which
sets out his ideas most comprehensively.
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constructed understanding of the relationship between the law of
contract and business.
COLLINS’ ARGUMENT—CONTRACT AND CONTRACTING BEHAVIOUR IN
THE REAL WORLD
How does Collins see the relationship between contract law and
transacting in the market? For Collins, any transaction can be seen
from three diﬀerent perspectives: the business relationship, the
economic deal and the contract. First, the business relationship:
The social and business relation between the parties both
precedes the transaction and is expected to persist after
performance. It consists of the trading relation between the
parties, made up of numerous interactions, some of which may
involve contracts, but often will consist of enquiries,
discussions of plans, and sorting out problems which have
arisen. Surrounding and sustaining the trading relation, we are
also likely to discover informal social relations, such as
business lunches, links through family or social networks of
friendships, membership of clubs, and ethnic identity . . . .
Action oriented towards the business relations has as its
predominant purpose the preservation and enhancement of
trust.3
To the extent that the business relationship matters, either because
the parties may expect to deal with each other in the future or
because of its reputational aspects (i.e., how others will perceive
either of them), the parties will place great importance on
maintaining and even deepening that relationship. This might mean,
for example, that parties will sacriﬁce possible gains or advantages
associated with either or both of the other two aspects of a
transaction in order to protect or enhance the business relationship.
Second, the economic deal:
Within this frame of reference, actions are assessed solely by
reference to economic self-interest. A breach of contract in
order to avoid loss represents a rational application of the
criteria, despite the betrayal and loss of trust which the breach
causes. The key measurement concerns the price or cost of
performance in relation to the value placed upon the expected
beneﬁt. Rational conduct by this criterion requires contractual
performance only when the beneﬁts exceed costs of default
combined with costs of making alternative transactions in the
market.4
The third aspect or framework of a transaction is the contract, the
formal legal relationship between the parties. Collins does not deny
3 Regulating Contracts, p. 129.
4 Ibid., p. 130.
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that this aspect is important. Nevertheless he thinks that it will
normally be less important than the business relationship and the
particular economic deal. It is only when the relationship has
broken down and the beneﬁts of relying on contractual rights
exceed the beneﬁts of continuing with the particular deal that there
will be recourse to contractual rights. Normally, however, the
contract will lie in the background. Indeed, as Collins notes,
contracts often will be drawn up principally for internal
bureaucratic reasons (for example, to keep records for large
organisations or as a management tool to control employees).5
Collins also alludes to the practice of disputing parties using
contracts as negotiating tools even where, for various reasons such
as maintenance of trust relations or the costs of legal enforcement,
recourse to the courts is not intended. Often, however, even the
recording of a deal in a written contract can be seen as indicating a
lack of trust in a trading partner or a possible constraint on future
action designed to help that or other trading partners.6 In other
words, the recording of contracts may be seen as a hostile
manoeuvre even without any attempt to give eﬀect to the rights
contained in them.
In sum then, Collins believes that the contractual aspect of a
transaction is usually a relatively minor or perhaps even unwanted
part of that transaction. Trust and non-legal sanctions are the best
and most used tools for avoiding and settling disputes and the law
is only used when it is economically rational to do so.
It is this understanding of the relationship between law and
transacting in the market that Collins believes should determine the
role and nature of contract law.7 Since Collins believes that
contract’s role is to assist eﬃcient exchanges, he quite naturally
5 Ibid., pp. 135–136, 231.
6 Ibid., pp. 130–137.
7 Some of Collins’ subsequent writing, in our eyes at least, has seen his analysis regress to a less
convincing position. In two recent articles, one co-authored with David Campbell, Collins
moves away from his tripartite classiﬁcation and insists, instead, that judges should investigate
the implicit dimensions of transacting to facilitate understanding of the proper working of the
explicit contract. As Ian Macneil notes, this has the eﬀect of putting the explicit contract at the
heart of the analysis and treating the context of the agreement as merely a resource for
understanding that contract. In contrast, Collins’ tripartite classiﬁcation places the focus on
transacting with the explicit contract as one, relatively minor, aspect of that complex entity.
One might say that Collins, having adopted a Copernican strategy in removing the explicit
contract from the centre of transacting then reverts to the position that he has criticised. See
H. Collins, ‘‘Introduction: The Research Agenda of Implicit Dimensions in Contracts’’, in D.
Campbell, H. Collins and J. Wightman (eds.), Implicit Dimensions of Contract, (Oxford 2003),
p. 1 and D. Campbell and H. Collins, ‘‘Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of Contracts’’, in
ibid., p. 25. For Macneil’s criticism, see I. Macneil, ‘‘Reﬂections on Relational Contract Theory
after a Neo-classical Seminar’’, in ibid., 207. In another contribution to this book Collins
adopts the tripartite analysis: H. Collins, ‘‘Discretionary Powers in Contracts’’, in ibid., p. 219.
This is all very confusing but in this paper our focus will be on Collins’ tripartite analysis
because we believe that this model is the best and most sophisticated analysis of transacting,
and the place of contract within it, currently available.
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asks whether contract law can be reformulated so that it can
enhance the eﬃciency of market transacting.
Collins argues that by becoming a hybrid form of law contract
will have great potential to do this. He argues that contract law is
already undergoing what he calls a productive disintegration.
According to him judges are increasingly renouncing their ﬁdelity
to contract law as a formal system of rules in favour of
incorporating economic and sociological information and insights
into their judgments in order to further overtly instrumentalist
aims. Collins sees this as a golden opportunity. If contract is in a
state of ﬂux, this is the ideal time to change it in the way that he
feels is appropriate.8 Collins’ main reason for thinking that contract
law provides a promising base for regulating the market is its very
nature. The common law, with its relatively loose conceptual
framework and less rigorous logical development, in comparison to
the civilian tradition, is, he argues, a good candidate to become a
hybrid form of law. He concludes by arguing that private law has
the potential to achieve the aims of public regulation without
falling victim to the problems that have bedevilled public
regulation.
How might the law be ‘‘hybridised’’? Collins argues that law is a
‘‘communication system’’ similar to the discourses of economics
and sociology and that, in order to become an eﬀective tool for the
market, the communication system of law should be open to the
insights and information oﬀered by those discourses. In practical
terms, this would mean that judges would openly incorporate
economic and sociological theory and data in legal rule and
decision-making. To enable judges to do this the ‘‘closure rules’’
(rules of evidence and procedure) of private law would have to be
changed. At the same time, however, Collins believes that the law
will always have strong forces favouring autonomy and that, for
reasons he does not adequately explain, the law should maintain
some autonomy. His position seems to be that the hybrid form is
necessary and desirable but that this should not and will not have
the consequence of the law becoming overwhelmed by the other
communication systems.
Having spelt out his notion of a hybrid law comprising
sociological and economic discourses engrafted upon contract law,
Collins is then faced with the task of showing that this hybrid form
of law is capable of carrying out the regulatory task that he has
described.
8 Regulating Contracts, pp. 31–55.
608 The Cambridge Law Journal [2004]
PRIVATE LAWAS DISCOURSE
Collins sees law as harnessing the knowledge of the discourses of
economics and sociology to create a new form of law, independent
but closely allied to and modelled on these other discourses.9 This
means that the formal rules of the old form of law will disappear
to be replaced by ‘‘more local regulation informed by a more
purposive approach to regulation’’.10 By local we assume that he
means a more diﬀerentiated set of rules to apply to particular
situations. According to him this new form of law will not only
learn from its interaction with other discourses; it can also learn
from its own experiences.11
Collins does not explain what he means by a communication
system and why law can be usefully described as such. In fact, to
describe law in this way seems to obscure more than it illuminates.
Is contract law a ‘‘discourse’’? Or is it the law, a historically
accepted form of state power, that has applied the common law’s
conceptions of justice to solve disputes brought before its courts?
As Atiyah has argued, law is not an intellectual discourse; it is a
closed, formal system of applying rules that does not advance
knowledge in an academically rigorous fashion.12 Economics and
sociology by contrast are open systems of knowledge. Unlike law
neither has a ﬁnal authority which can, indeed must, resolve
disputes and, unlike the practice of law, both try to expand the
amount of knowledge that comes within their compass.13
By labelling law a discourse Collins is able to make his
argument; but is he really comparing like with like? It may appear
persuasive to talk in abstract terms of combining communication
systems, but when the fundamental diﬀerences between law and the
academic disciplines of economics and sociology are properly
considered, the mixing seems much less plausible. Law, or more
accurately the practice of law, is diﬀerent from the other, primarily
academic disciplines. Sociology, economics and law can all be
studied descriptively and thus be labelled sciences. And each can
oﬀer prescriptions for government action. But Collins’ rather blithe
assertion that the three discourses can be mixed seems to be
9 Ibid., pp. 54–55. Collins is not entirely clear whether this will result in law becoming part of
these discourses. In several places he states that law has lost its special character ( pp. 46, 53),
yet his discussion is based on a claim that law has suﬃcient resilience to maintain its
independence even if it is radically transformed (pp. 54–5). We are not told why Collins
places so much importance on the independence of contract or private law more generally.
10 Ibid., p. 55.
11 Ibid. As we will see Collins is not always this optimistic about the learning potential of the
law.
12 P. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (London 1987).
13 M. Dan-Cohen, ‘‘Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and Its Audience’’
(1992) 63 University of Colorado Law Review 569.
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suggesting that the sciences of sociology and economics can be
grafted onto the practice of law, i.e., that academic discourses can
be grafted on to an act of governance. Talk of mixing and cross-
fertilisation would be persuasive only if Collins had noted these
important diﬀerences and explained how they were to be overcome.
CHANGING THE CLOSURE RULES
We have expressed concern about Collins’ characterisation of law as
a discourse. At least as worrying is the package of ‘‘procedural
reforms’’ that must be put in place to eﬀectuate the desired melding
of contract law and other discourses.
The existing framework or model in which common law judges
make private law renders the courts quite passive law-makers.
There must be a plaintiﬀ with standing who must bring a live
matter before a court of competent jurisdiction and who must
make a prima facie case against a defendant over whom the court
has personal jurisdiction. In addition the court is constrained by
evidentiary and procedural rules in the processes it follows and the
information upon which it acts. When these requirements of
rendering a valid judgment are satisﬁed, the court may hand down
a decision. This decision will bind only the parties to the matter
even though it will also state the law which will apply in the future
to like cases. Judges who operate within this system are usually
quite restrained in commenting on issues which are not squarely in
dispute between the parties before them. When they do so
comment, it is with the understanding that their comments are not
law and are not binding in other disputes. This framework, of
course, is deviated from at times, but such deviations need to be
carefully scrutinised to ensure that they do not threaten the eﬃcacy
and legitimacy of the model as a dispute-resolution tool.
Sprinkled throughout Regulating Contracts are admissions that,
in order for the private law of contract to play the regulating role
that Collins advocates, it will be necessary to open the closure rules
described above. These rules are said to ‘‘close’’ the private law
process by limiting what information it considers, as indeed they
do. A quick look at these proposals, which are rather dismissively
summarised in the conclusion of the book as ‘‘minor adjustments,
often at the level of procedure rather than substantive law’’,14 will
show courts sometimes deciding questions brought by interest
groups as opposed to interested plaintiﬀs,15 where the questions do
14 Ibid., p. 358.
15 Ibid., p. 88.
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not necessarily reﬂect any live dispute,16 with the burden of proof
shifted to the defendant at times.17 In deciding such questions the
courts will have access to sociological and economic data in a form
akin to Brandeis Briefs.18 The parol evidence rule will have to be
completely eliminated so that broad ‘‘evidence’’ of the business
context, the relationship between the parties and the deal that they
have made, is not blocked by evidence of their written contract.19
What Collins does not tell us is what the status of these judicial
determinations will be. Will they be law, or will they be advisory
opinions? Will they bind the party who asked the question or any
other parties or future courts? These are important questions
because, despite his attempts to play down his ‘‘minor
adjustments’’, Collins is undeniably advocating a brave new role for
common law courts. As such these are fundamental, not minor,
changes to the nature of the common law.
In an ironic twist Collins advocates some of these changes to
private adjudication because they have proven valuable in the
sphere of public regulation. For instance, he suggests that the
burden of proving compliance with the contract should be shifted
to the defendant because this is done in some public regulatory
schemes.20 Drawing support from the public sector in this way does
not sit well with the claim central to his book that public
regulatory models have failed to live up to their promise. Private
law is posited as the way forward and yet to function in this way it
must sacriﬁce the characteristics that make it private and take on
some of the key characteristics of public regulation. What will not
be adopted are the constraints on public law-making and
enforcement. No system of legislative or executive oversight, of
ministerial control or of responsible government will constrain the
power of the courts in their application of hybrid law.
For the most part, though, these suggested changes to the
closure rules are only supported by the assumption that Collins’
overall programme is a good one and that these changes are needed
to implement it. We think that this programme is seriously ﬂawed
on a number of grounds. But even if one thought otherwise, the
proposals that the procedures that govern private law adjudication
should be dramatically overhauled in order to achieve Collins’ goals
are of concern. There is, of course, a large literature on the merits
and shortcomings of the various procedural rules that Collins wants
to abandon or modify. It would not have been possible, or even
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p. 90.
18 Ibid., p. 87.
19 Ibid., pp. 158–160.
20 Ibid., pp. 89–90.
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desirable, for Collins to have canvassed all of these. But the blithe
description of these changes as ‘‘minor adjustments’’ completely
misstates and misunderstands their nature.
CONTRACT AS REGULATION
As noted above, Collins argues that private law has the potential
eﬀectively to replace public regulation because its ﬂexibility will
allow it to overcome the diﬃculties that have plagued public
regulation. But before we consider whether Collins’ arguments
about the ﬂexibility and potential of contract law are persuasive it
should be considered whether his characterisation of private law as
a form of regulation is appropriate and convincing.
Collins assumes that the main, indeed, apparently the only,
purpose of contract is to facilitate market exchange.21 This allows
him to assert that contract is a form of regulation similar in
fundamentals to, if somewhat diﬀerent in detail from, public
regulation. How convincing is this analogy? Collins says that
regulation can be understood as ‘‘any system of rules intended to
govern the behaviour of its subjects’’.22 The breadth of this
deﬁnition disables analysis. It equates all law with regulation and
forecloses the very point of whether a body of private law can or
should be treated as a regulatory tool.
Public regulation, as commonly understood, is a creature of the
nineteenth and, mainly, the twentieth centuries. It has usually taken
the form of government-appointed bodies giving eﬀect to
governmental standards, principles or desired outcomes. Usually,
but not always, the persons appointed to such bodies are experts in
relevant ﬁelds. The Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission or the United Kingdom Monopolies Commission are
examples of such bodies, sharing in this instance the responsibility
for the maintenance of government mandated principles of market
competition. The private law, in comparison, has been developed
over many centuries by a small body of people expert in a fairly
esoteric body of knowledge, who were not formally aligned to the
government of the day and whose guiding principles were and are
notions of justice and the principled development of a body of
rules according the traditions and practices established over those
centuries. Ibbetson has made a strong case for seeing the notion of
reciprocity as the norm underlying many centuries of the
development of common law rules dealing with contract.23 These
21 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
22 Ibid., p. 7.
23 D. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford 1999).
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rules and the notions of justice that underpinned them were not
government policy; indeed, it could be argued that the common law
was developed at a substantial distance from government policy
and goals. The judges did not see themselves as government
appointees and the result of their work was not measurable against
a standard or goal, apart from the dispensing of justice. The latter,
of course, could not and would not be quantiﬁed in the way that,
for example, the Monopolies Commission’s work would be.
Of course, the common law and regulation do now intersect at
many points.24 Judges frequently have to police the processes of
regulatory bodies and in many instances they now apply regulatory
regimes. Corporate law is an example of as a mixture of traditional
legal rules and administrative procedure. However, this close
interaction between law and regulation does not obviate the need
for analysis. It is one thing to recognise the increasing interaction
between the two. It is another to ignore fundamental diﬀerences
and assume that the two are now interchangeable and part of one
broader regulatory framework. Similarly, the costs as well as the
supposed advantages of a closer interaction between private law
and regulation have to be recognised and weighed, not simply
ignored.25 One is free to advocate that law and regulation should be
integrated but Collins’ assumption that they are, and his
consequent failure to analyse the possible disadvantages of such a
change, are unpersuasive.
In any event, as we will suggest below, the focus on regulation
and regulatory discourse is misguided because we think that the
problems facing contract law today are best understood other than
by using a regulatory lens.
LITIGATION AS A SOURCE OF REFLEXIVE LAW
Central to Collins’ understanding of a hybrid law is the capacity of
private law to ‘‘learn’’ from its environment about its eﬀects so that
it can continually improve itself as an eﬃcient means of regulating
market transactions. In his discussion of Barclays Bank plc v.
O’Brien,26 he suggests that private law has already commenced its
productive disintegration from its formalist roots and that litigation
is one means by which this occurs. He notes that the courts have
24 See, for example, J. Black, ‘‘Critical Reﬂections on Regulation’’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal
of Legal Philosophy 1 for a wide-ranging discussion on contemporary views about the nature
and reach of regulation and its intersections with law.
25 Simon Deakin provides a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between law and regulation
and its future in S. Deakin, ‘‘Private Law, Economic Rationality and the Regulatory State’’ in
P. Birks (ed), The Classiﬁcation of Obligations (Oxford 1997), 283.
26 [1994] 1 A.C. 180.
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imposed duties on banks to make sure that sureties are adequately
aware of the risks of guaranteeing a loan. He then goes on to say:
Through observation of litigation coming before the courts,
private law regulation can be adjusted in order to strike an
eﬃcient balance between imposing onerous duties on banks to
comply with detailed bureaucratic procedures and the
protection of vulnerable sureties.27
He adds that
Private law in its applications learns from its environment
about the eﬀects of its rules on the subjects of regulation. This
observation then permits the recursive process of further
reﬁnement of the legal rules in order to modify their eﬀects (as
they are understood by the law).28
Can litigation act in this way? After all, is litigation not usually
considered to be unrepresentative, unpredictable and dominated by
‘‘repeat players’’?29 Can cases before the courts be used in the
fashion that Collins indicates to achieve the end that he wants? We
think it unlikely, and Collins himself provides arguments against
this proposition.
He acknowledges that most people do not have the money to
ﬁght cases in the courts.30 This means, of course, that the feedback
given by litigation is going to be unrepresentative and skewed in
favour of those with the resources or temperament to go to court.
Surely Collins cannot think that this sort of information is going to
help create a new form of private law that is more attuned to the
market’s needs? He acknowledges that the source of information
emanating from litigation is ‘‘haphazard and unreliable’’.31 He also
accepts that the process of private law settlement of particular
disputes before the court means that the results do not provide
useful lessons for the setting of business standards to guide courts
in the settlement of disputes throughout an industry.32 Yet, if the
result of litigation cannot provide such information, one has to ask
what the law can ‘‘learn’’ from litigation? Collins clearly recognises
this problem when he notes that the defect of litigation as a
feedback mechanism is ‘‘that it provides highly selective
27 Regulating Contracts, pp. 50–51.
28 Ibid., p. 55.
29 M. Galanter, ‘‘Why the ‘Haves’ come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change’’ (1974–5) 9 Law and Society Review 95. Indeed, it could be argued that Collins’
description of the operation of hybrid law in the area of sureties is a classic example of repeat
players, the banks, using litigation to achieve results that suit them rather than the law being
reﬂexive in the way that Collins wants. We thank Jeannie Paterson for this suggestion.
30 Regulating Contracts, pp. 69, 323.
31 Ibid., p. 74.
32 Ibid., pp. 81, 292–295.
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information’’33 because litigation is dominated by those with a taste
for and the money to go to the courts.
This feedback mechanism is therefore likely to provide the
courts with a distorted source of information about the eﬀects
of regulation. As a consequence, even when the courts
introduce into the legal reasoning a more contextual
appreciation of the regulatory context, they are starved of
reliable information about that context.34
To the extent that Collins’ proposed hybrid law needs
information from litigation to become a more eﬃcient reﬂection of
market needs and expectations, Collins’ own arguments show that
this is unlikely to happen.
CAN A HYBRID LAW WORK? DISSEMINATION OF CASE RESULTS
One of the ways in which Collins claims that hybrid law will
regulate the market is the eﬀect court decisions will have on market
behaviour and perceptions.
Although the application of a state sanction provides the
occasional dramatic conclusion of the legal process, the more
pervasive eﬀect of the legal system in steering social
behaviour derives from the dissemination of its legal
reasoning into other communication systems . . . . The court
provides an authoritative statement of what has happened.
This statement is usually regarded by the community as
reliable, as fact, as truth. Moreover, it is a public statement,
which can be heard and acted upon by all members of the
trading community.35
But Collins himself appreciates that things might not be that
simple. In his discussion of the failings of private law as an
instrument for market regulation he admits that it is incapable of
publicising its results. After all, can we really expect busy market
players to read, let alone understand, law reports and other legal
literature (assuming that a case is reported, of course)?
The detailed regulatory standards produced by private law can
only be gleaned from the reports of courts’ decisions, which
are seldom complete. These decisions are then only
disseminated by uncoordinated private publicity in the form of
books and articles about the law . . . . Eﬀective standard setting
plainly requires the dissemination of information about the
requirements, for otherwise exact compliance tends to be
fortuitous. But the private law system can rarely achieve
33 Ibid., p. 85.
34 Ibid., pp. 85–86.
35 Ibid., pp. 123–124.
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adequate dissemination of its standards to the regulated industry
or market.36
The contrast with Bernstein’s diamond traders or cotton traders
and the eﬃciency of their information networks, i.e., gossip, is
stark indeed.37
CAN JUDGES APPLY A HYBRID LAW?
Collins’ central contention is that a suitably developed hybrid law
has the potential to become an eﬃcient regulatory tool for the
market. In this section we will ask whether judges can carry out the
task demanded by Collins’ hybrid law and whether the information
they need will be available.
We have seen that Collins believes that a hybrid law will take
into account not only the formal terms of a contract but the
business relation and the social and economic context of the
transaction. First, the business relation. A hybrid law must
appreciate the relationship between the parties:
The most appropriate form of legal regulation would temper
its formalism with a sensitivity to the particular facts of the
case, especially the history of prior dealings, and an
understanding of the informal conventions (and formal trading
standards where available) governing the business relation.38
In order to uncover the latent intentions of the parties, the
judges would have to engage in a process of legal reasoning ‘‘that
examines the context of the transaction in order to discover a
complete picture of the parties’ intentions and expectations’’.39
How is a judge to form an understanding of the informal
conventions governing a business relation? Is it really plausible that
36 Ibid., p. 81 (emphasis added). See also ibid., p. 233 and S. Macaulay, ‘‘The Real and the
Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent
Simple Rules’’ in Campbell, Implicit Dimensions of Contract at pp. 51, 77.
37 L Bernstein, ‘‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions’’(2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724 and L Bernstein,
‘‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’’
(1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115. John Kidwell has argued that to the extent that
litigation does pass on information to prospective transactors it can only do this within a
formalist regime. Attempts to take into account the nature of a particular relationship render
any information so idiosyncratic that it would be useless to other transacting parties. J.
Kidwell, ‘‘A Caveat’’ [1985] Wisconsin Law Review 615.
38 Regulating Contracts, p. 181 (footnote omitted). Collins has subsequently raised doubts about
the wisdom and the capacity of judges to do what he earlier claimed that they can and should
do. D. Campbell and H. Collins, ‘‘Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of Contracts’’ in
Campbell, Implicit Dimensions of Contract 25 at 48; H. Collins, ‘‘Discretionary Powers in
Contracts’’ in ibid., 219 at p. 237. See also his comments on pp. 253–254 where Collins
acknowledges that the operation of hybrid law would result in general, abstract standards
rather than decisions which precisely ﬁtted the contours of the parties’ expectations and
experiences.
39 H. Collins, ‘‘Introduction: The Research Agenda of Implicit Dimensions of Contracts’’ in
Campbell, Implicit Dimensions of Contract 1 at p. 13 (emphasis added).
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anyone apart from the parties could have any understanding of
their business relation? Indeed, even the parties may have diﬀerent
conceptions about the nature of that relationship. Judges do not
have the luxury of getting know both parties in the way the parties
do in an evolving relationship. This means that they will not have
the sensitive and precise information about the parties’ relationship
that Collins requires of them. And, if the business partners
themselves have diﬀerent perceptions, how is a judge to decide
between them? After all, both may be right—from their respective
points of view. A classic example of the diﬃculty here would be
situation where a history of waivers for breach of strict delivery
dates might be understood by the breaching party as just part of
the normal give and take of daily business, while the other side
might see it as increasing evidence of the unreliability of the
breaching party and to be put up with only until an alternative
source of supply is found. By its very nature, the evidence for
either point of view is likely to be non-existent or extremely
fragmentary and ambiguous. How is a judge supposed to ﬁnd the
‘‘true’’ nature of the business relation? Of course, Collins refuses to
acknowledge that formalism is designed to overcome the
impossibility of anyone knowing what goes on in the minds of
contracting parties.
Collins’ position also ignores the possibility of opportunism.
How is a judge to know whether one of the parties in the above
example has decided, opportunistically, to claim that the nature of
the business relationship is X rather than Y? Collins also fails to
consider the possibility that the parties or one of them may hide
information either for gains associated with a particular transaction
or to protect valuable trade or operational secrets.40 Can judges
discover such information? Will the parties want it to be made
public in court proceedings?
If we examine an example that Collins gives of judges
supposedly understanding the business relationship, it quickly
becomes apparent that the task is not easy. Collins acknowledges
that the report of Williams v. Roﬀey Bros.41 did not explain the
nature of previous dealings between the parties but says that one
could ‘‘surmise’’ that the parties were familiar with each other and
that one could ‘‘infer’’ that a continuing business relationship was
likely to be important to the parties.42 Surely it is a dangerous
strategy for a judge to base his or her decisions about the actual
40 R. Scott, ‘‘The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract’’ (2000) 94 Northwestern
University Law Review 847, 863–864.
41 Williams v. Roﬀey Bros and Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd. [1991] 1 Q.B. 1.
42 Regulating Contracts, pp. 144–145.
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beliefs of the contracting parties on such guesswork. And Collins
does acknowledge the impossibility of reading the minds of the
parties.
Compared to the stark evidence of the written contract,
however, the court will encounter diﬃculty in abstracting from
the conduct of the parties the content of their normative
standards based upon the deal or business relation. The best
evidence is likely to be found in past conduct, such as previous
dealings or deviations from the contractual self-regulation in
practice. But even this evidence is always open to diﬀerent
interpretations.43
The next level of knowledge required by the judges is that of the
context of the transaction. Can judges incorporate the learning
generated by economic and sociological studies in their decision-
making? The problems facing them are daunting. The ﬁrst problem
is the lack of expertise and knowledge of the judges. How can they
incorporate this knowledge when their training and work experience
are not directed towards acquiring it, and their skills are not
necessarily helpful in analysing such information? In his discussion
of Smith v. Eric S Bush Ltd,44 Collins admits this. In Smith the
court was not in a position to judge whether denying surveyors the
right to exclude liability would price some consumers out of the
market. As Collins admits,
[Reasoning in] the private law lacks the capacity to examine
this evidence by the standards of an empirical and systematic
economic analysis to discover where the new equilibrium will
be set. Instead, private law regulation ﬁxes the standard by
reference to an economic hypothesis about the eﬀects of
regulation, and then awaits further information from
subsequent litigation to determine the validity of the
hypothesis. The source of the information is, of course,
haphazard and unreliable.45
It is not clear that it helps if there is empirical work available
despite Collins’ best endeavours to show that it would. Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.46 is a celebrated case involving the
sale of stereo equipment on terms that would allow the company to
repossess the goods on a failure to make a payment, with the
transaction having the legal form of a conditional sales agreement.
Some ﬁfteen years after the case was decided, a study of the
operations of the company was published and it is this study that
Collins attempts to use as an example of how hybrid judging would
43 Ibid., p. 147 (emphasis added).
44 [1990] 1 A.C. 831.
45 Regulating Contracts, p. 74.
46 121 US App DC 315; 350 F 2d 445 (1965).
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work if empirical evidence were available.47 Of course, one could
ask whether the passage of ﬁfteen years, which encompassed the
end of the long post-war boom and which ended with the
stagﬂation following on the two OPEC oil price rises in the 1970s,
would raise questions about whether the information relevant for
1980 was useful in considering what happened in 1965. Collins
never considers this aspect of the use of contextual knowledge and
claims that ‘‘we can be reasonably conﬁdent about most of the
context by drawing on Greenberg’s study’’.48 This conﬁdence is
misplaced. Collins asserts that the contract price was greatly
inﬂated but gives no evidence of this, instead suggesting that ‘‘we
may infer’’ that the normal price was much lower. He admits that
there was no evidence about the allocation of risks for faulty goods
but says that one ‘‘may surmise’’ that the risk was against the
buyer although ‘‘it seems’’ that it was the practice to give some
form of warranty, although this might have been ‘‘illusory’’ because
the company ‘‘apparently’’ reserved the discretion to determine
whether goods were faulty or not.49 Collins believes that the only
way in which a hybrid judge could determine whether the contract
was unfair is to compare the contractual provisions against the
contextual evidence of the transaction. He argues that the
company’s contractual advantages may have been balanced by the
fact that one ‘‘may surmise’’ that the buyer was considered to be a
poor credit risk by the company.50 He concedes that there is
insuﬃcient information to know whether the amount of the price
paid for the guarantee was fair but that this ‘‘might’’ result in a
relatively fair bargain.51 Was this contract unfair because the price
was excessive? According to him this is not an easy question to
answer.
We cannot be sure on the basis of the available information
whether or not we should regard this contract as unfair on the
ground of excessive price. We would need to discover what
interest rates might have been charged to the appellant in the
open market and how the price of the goods was calculated
. . . . The problem here is to decide which market may be the
appropriate comparison, and then to make some allowance for
a normal variation of prices within markets. Nevertheless, these
obstacles can be overcome by some rough estimates, which
would probably demonstrate that the price charged was greatly
at variance with any competitive market.52
47 D. Greenberg, ‘‘Easy Terms, Hard Times: Complaint Handling in the Ghetto’’, in L. Nader
(ed), No Access to Law: Alternatives to the American Judicial System (New York 1980), 379.
48 Regulating Contracts, p. 262.
49 Ibid., p. 263.
50 Ibid., p. 264.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 265 (emphasis added).
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Collins’ after-the-event analysis of Walker-Thomas starkly illustrates
that even were contextual information available it would lead only
to guesswork. Is hybrid judging going to be just a matter of
inferences, surmises and rough estimates? We must remember that
this is the case Collins picks; most contractual disputes would not
have an available study to fall back on. Just how much guesswork
would then be required is a matter of guesswork.53
Collins’ problem is that he asks the impossible of judges. He
expects them to apply law in a way that takes into account the
intimate economic and social relationships between the parties and
the economic and social context of transacting more generally, and
also to be sensitive to the special problems arising from contracts
with the government.54 All this as well as, of course, having an
appropriate level of expertise in law. A superhuman made up of
Oliver Williamson, Max Weber, Ronald Dworkin’s Hercules and Sir
Humphrey Appleby might succeed at doing some of this, but even
this superhuman would baulk at getting into the heads of disputing
contracting parties! Judges are never going to be able to do what
Collins asks of them.55
Another diﬃculty facing Collins, however, may be that the
information about context, especially where it concerns business
custom and expectations, does not exist or where it does exist, it is
not information that can be used in the straightforward way he
suggests.56
53 Stewart Macaulay’s analysis of Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco Inc. 52 Ohio St. 3d 232, 556
N.E. 2d 515 (1990) provides a ﬁne example of a judge trying to ‘‘contextualise’’ the decision
but being reduced to guesswork because information was either non-existent or unavailable. S.
Macaulay, ‘‘The Real Deal and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships,
Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules’’ in Campbell, Implicit Dimensions of
Contract, 51 at pp. 85–88. Collins’ use of a study by Richard Lewis on the law of ﬁrm oﬀers
in the building industry raises similar problems and ignores Lewis’s own advice that his study
could not be used for the type of argument that Collins makes. Regulating Contracts, pp. 190–
191. The study cited is R. Lewis, ‘‘Contracts between Businessmen: Reform of the Law of
Firm Oﬀers and an Empirical Study of Tendering Practices in the Building Industry’’ (1982) 9
Journal of Law and Society 153, 169–170.
54 Regulating Contracts, pp. 318–320.
55 For Eric Posner this ‘‘radical incompetence’’ is merely part and parcel of a judicial role which
accepts that contracting parties will use the courts tactically as part of a broader menu of
governance options. Under this understanding the parties will take advantage of formalist
judging when trust or non-legal sanctions are either weak or inappropriate. Thus, Posner does
not think that judges can make hybrid decisions—indeed he thinks the opposite but sees this
as a realistic appraisal of what judges can do, of what parties want from the law and how the
law is used. E. Posner, ‘‘A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial
Error’’ (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 749. Stewart Macaulay provides
indirect support for Posner’s thesis in his analysis of large corporations using court decisions
tactically as part of a wider dispute resolution process. S. Macaulay, ‘‘The Real and the Paper
Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple
Rules’’ in Campbell, Implicit Dimensions of Contract, 51 at pp. 84–101.
56 While the focus of our discussion in this paper is on the insurmountable practical problems
facing judges who want to make contextualist decisions we are happy to endorse Roger
Brownsword’s illuminating discussion of the theoretical indeterminacy associated with a
contextualist project such as Collins’. See R. Brownsword, ‘‘After Investors: Interpretation,
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DOES BUSINESS CUSTOM EXIST AND IF IT DOES CAN JUDGES USE IT?
Lisa Bernstein has argued that business customs do not exist in the
form of clear-cut rules which apply across a business community.
Her investigation of early twentieth century attempts by several
large commodities industries to codify their respective customs
showed an incapacity to identify customs, to agree about the
‘‘meaning of common terms of trade or discover the content of
many basic commercial practices’’.57 Bernstein did ﬁnd that
merchants found it valuable to have an understanding of how trade
was generally carried out as this helped them to evaluate a
potential transacting partner. She argued that these ‘‘weak-form’’
customs
. . . provide transactors with a pool of common knowledge that
in the early stages of their contracting relationship enables
them to better assess whether the other transactor is a
cooperator or a defector, thereby facilitating the emergence
and maintenance of repeat-dealing cooperative contracting
relationships.58
In other words, the customs that existed were not ready-made, neat
rules that could be used to settle disputes. Rather, they provided
‘‘transactors with a set of vaguely deﬁned yet workable
relationship-creating norms that initially add tremendous value to
contracting relationships but that gradually diminish in importance
as contracting relationships mature’’.59 While such norms are
important to the parties, they are not going to be useful to a judge
looking for guidance in settling a dispute. Indeed, Collins has
subsequently acknowledged that the latter form of customs may not
exist.60
Kraus and Walt have raised important objections to Bernstein’s
position. First, they suggest that Bernstein’s argument that national
customs did not exist is premised on the existence of competing
local customs whose existence prevented national agreement. If this
is the case, they argue, it would be perfectly sound for a judge to
apply the local standard or custom in a dispute between local
merchants.61 Even if this is correct, this argument does not help
Expectation and the Implicit Dimension of the ‘New Contextualism’ ’’ in Campbell, Implicit
Dimensions of Contract, 103.
57 L. Bernstein, ‘‘The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A
Preliminary Study’’ (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Review 710, at p. 715.
58 Ibid., p. 717.
59 Ibid., p. 717.
60 H. Collins, ‘‘Discretionary Powers in Contracts’’ in Campbell, Implicit Dimensions of Contract,
219 at p. 237.
61 J. Kraus and S. Walt, ‘‘In defence of the Incorporation strategy’’ in J. Kraus and S. Walt
(eds.), The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law (Cambridge 2000),
193 at pp. 201–202.
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Collins very much. What is a hybrid judge to do when a dispute is
between market players who adhere to diﬀerent, perhaps
inconsistent, customs?
Kraus and Walt further argue that Bernstein misstates her
position. Rather than showing that customs do not exist because of
widespread disagreement about the meaning of usual terms or
practices, they argue that all she has shown is that these terms and
practices are not precise. As they argue, the ‘‘incorporation strategy
is useful even if it incorporates imprecise customs, so long as these
customs serve at least to deﬁne a range of reasonable . . .
disagreement over the meaning of contract terms’’.62 Even if true
this it renders implausible Collins’ picture of a hybrid law which
allows judges precisely to adapt contract law to follow the workings
of commerce.63
Clearly, much work needs to be done to see whether, in fact,
trade customs do exist. What Bernstein has done, however, is
challenge the assumption that they do, and while her arguments
have been criticised they have not been refuted. Even if one
concedes the criticisms of Kraut and Walt, Collins’ proposal is still
undermined because if custom exists in a form that is local and
imprecise it is not clear that this is the form of custom that he
needs for his hybrid jurisprudence to operate.
Craswell concedes that customs exist. But that by itself tells us
nothing because, according to him, customs can make sense only
when they have been interpreted and until this happens they are
essentially meaningless. Customs, even those which seem to be hard
and fast rules, have to be considered and evaluated by traders to
see whether and how to apply them in the particular circumstances
of the transaction before them. The custom has to be evaluated in
the light of the goals of the transaction (which could be either
immediate proﬁt or relationship-building for future proﬁt or a
mixture of both) and by weighing its application against other,
sometimes competing customs. Craswell’s conclusion challenges
Collins’ position.
In short, many industry customs will require a considerable
amount of case-by-case judgment on the part of the industry
members. If courts rely on the members’ testimony about what
a particular custom requires, they will be relying on the
industry members’ own judgments, and not on a set of rules
that makes such judgments unnecessary.64
62 Ibid., p. 203.
63 Regulating Contracts, p. 191.
64 R. Craswell, ‘‘Do Trade Customs Exist?’’ in Kraus and Walt Jurisprudential Foundations, 118
at p. 135.
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As Kraus and Walt point out, this understanding of custom does
not rule out an incorporation strategy. What it does require,
however, is that the judgment will have to be that of experts, in
this case merchants, because their judgment in interpreting and
applying custom will be better than that of the judges.65
Scott and Danzig have noted separately that the courts have
never really carried out the empirical work needed to discover
norms, relying instead on deductive speculation66 or the projection
of the judges’ own values through a false claim of discovery,67 to
identify the norms necessary for the incorporation strategy of the
US Uniform Commercial Code. Craswell emphasises the
inescapable role of judgment in identifying norms, whereas Scott
and Danzig emphasise the empirical reality that judges are
eﬀectively creating the norms that they apply.
A systematic examination of the litigated cases interpreting the
‘‘reasonableness’’ standards of Article 2 [of the UCC] reveals
that courts have consistently interpreted these statutory
instructions not as inductive directions to incorporate
commercial norms and prototypes but rather as invitations to
make deductive speculations according to ‘‘Code policy’’ or
other noncontextual criteria.68
Partly this is a matter of cost. Can courts be expected to carry
out anything other than deductive speculation when there is usually
no study to call upon and no money, expertise, or even power to
conduct one? Partly this is a matter of legal culture. Common law
judges have become judges, in the main, because of their expertise
in law, an expertise developed over many years. Is it surprising that
their treatment of business custom is ﬁltered through a legal mind
and a legal methodology that has been at the heart of their
professional lives? Here Collins ignores the professional forces that
will always operate to make the incorporation of business custom
in law a diﬃcult exercise.69
In theory, of course, Collins’ project does not necessarily have to
exhibit the sort of application of norms that Scott and Danzig have
described. However, the living example of what judges have
actually done when given a task that is essentially similar to that
65 Kraus and Walt, ‘‘Incorporation Strategy’’, pp. 204–206.
66 R. Scott, ‘‘The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law’’ in Kraus and Walt, Jurisprudential
Foundations, 149 at p. 166.
67 R. Danzig, ‘‘A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code’’ (1975) 27
Stanford Law Review 621 at pp 628–629.
68 Scott, ‘‘Uniformity Norm’’, 166. Richard Crasswell makes also makes a similar argument. See
Crasswell, ‘‘Do Trade Customs Exist?’’, 118, at pp. 124–125.
69 Paddy Ireland has argued that legally imposed norms, by giving eﬀect to non-market, public
values will in turn become part of the context in transacting: P. Ireland, ‘‘Recontractualising
the Corporation: Implicit Contract as Ideology’’ in Campbell, Implicit Dimensions of Contract,
255 at pp. 284–286.
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promoted by Collins does suggest that the same institutional,
intellectual or ﬁnancial constraints that have operated on US judges
would have similar eﬀects on Collins’ hybrid judges.
So far a number of issues have been raised about what can be
seen as Collins’ naı¨ve reliance on the incorporation of business
custom as a central strategy in the creation and operation of a
hybrid contract law. Bernstein’s work raises doubts about the
existence of business customs in a form that could be useful for a
hybrid judge. Craswell adds a dimension that is missing in Collins’
discussion by showing that customs are not neatly packaged, ready
to be picked oﬀ the shelf by a judge who can slot them seamlessly
in a hybrid judgment. The necessity for interpretation and judgment
renders this a task that can be best (maybe only) done by market
players. Finally, investigations of how US judges have dealt with
the incorporation strategy of the UCC suggest that speculation or
the imposition of the judge’s own views will be the modus operandi
of a hybrid judge.
But the problems associated with the notion of incorporating
business custom into judging do not end here.
ARE CUSTOMS EFFICIENT?
Even if it is accepted that business norms exist in a form that
courts can use, it is still not clear that Collins’ project is viable.
Underlying his argument is an assumption that business norms are
eﬃcient and fair, at least from a business perspective. If he did not
think that they were, the whole point of hybrid judging would be
defeated. Is this assumption valid? Eric Posner has suggested that
the formulation and continued existence of business norms may
owe little to eﬃciency and fairness and more to the ‘‘path
dependency’’ which explains continued use of the QWERTY
keyboard.70 In business there is no guarantee that the best customs
survive; indeed Posner argues that it may be unlikely that the most
eﬃcient customs will survive and prosper. We should remember
Robert Gordon’s warning about the ‘‘dark side’’ of relational
contracting,71 where dominant market players create and shape
business customs in ways that favour their needs. A hybrid judge
implementing this form of custom would merely be giving a legal
70 E. Posner, ‘‘Law, Economics, and Ineﬃcient Norms’’ (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 1697. See also, J. Kraus, ‘‘Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial
Norms’’ (1997) 26 Journal of Legal Studies 377.
71 R. Gordon, ‘‘Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract
Law’’[1985] Wisconsin LR 565, 570–571. See also C. Milhaupt and M. West, ‘‘The Dark Side
of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organised Crime’’ (2000) 67
University of Chicago Law Review 41.
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imprimatur to this power imbalance and to rent-seeking behaviour
by better organised and more powerful market players.72
Of course, Collins could respond by suggesting that problems of
ineﬃciency in commercial norms can be overcome by relying on
formal trade customs, rules and the like. But by itself this does not
respond to Bernstein’s doubts about the existence of workable
norms. After all, her study of several major commodity sectors
demonstrated, to her satisfaction at least, that even these types of
norms were thin on the ground. And it does not respond to the
concern that, even if norms are identiﬁable, they may reﬂect the
needs of dominant or powerful players rather than the best interests
of the industry. These norms are unlikely to be eﬃcient, let alone
fair. Finally, while the trade associations or other such bodies may
have the expertise to best identify norms, their own particular
characteristics may lead them to favour ineﬃcient norms. Charny is
emphatic about this.
The formulators here are not the innocently decentralised
village gossips described in many parables about norms; they
are sophisticated political organisations apparently dominated
by cohesive groups whose members share a common interest.
In terms of ‘‘public choice’’ theory, then, we have an almost
formulaic situation for generating ineﬃcient norms—norms
that favour the members of the concentrated interest groups, at
the expense of more diﬀuse members.73
Charny’s analysis of one of the commodity industry bodies studied
by Bernstein, the National Grain and Feed Association, shows that
this concern is not misplaced. Schwartz and Scott’s study of the
workings of the American Law Institute shows how such ‘‘private
legislatures’’ are easy targets for rent-seeking behaviour.74 Trade
association formulation of norms does not overcome the likely
problem of ineﬃciency of business norms.
Collins’ proposed hybrid judging cannot work. He demands of
judges skills and knowledge beyond their capacity, and the
impossibility of these demands becomes evident in the examples of
hybrid judging that he gives. Furthermore, while Collins’ proposal
relies heavily on the incorporation of economic and sociological
insights into judging, his examples of this are unconvincing and he
does not answer concerns about the cost and availability of such
information. Finally, even though his proposed hybrid law would
72 One could add here the arguments of Jody Kraus based on his work on legal evolution: J.
Kraus, ‘‘Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms’’ (1997) 26 Journal of Legal
Studies 377.
73 D. Charny, ‘‘Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: ‘Norms’ in Contractual Relationships’’ (1996)
144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1841 at p. 1848 (emphasis in original).
74 A. Schwartz and R. Scott, ‘‘The Political Economy of Private Legislatures’’ (1995) 143
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 595.
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rely heavily on business norms and customs to provide information
about the transacting context, he fails to engage with wide ranging
debate over the existence and usefulness of these norms. In the next
section we will consider whether hybrid judging, were it possible,
would actually help commerce.
WILL HYBRID JUDGING HARM COMMERCE? FORMALISM AND COLLINS
Perhaps the biggest problem with Collins’ proposal is that it would
not be in the interests of business.
Collins argues that private law maximises ﬂexibility by allowing
the parties to set standards and monitor compliance with these
standards:
The great strength of . . . private law regulation of contracts is
plainly its responsive or reﬂexive quality. It devolves an
extensive discretionary power of self-regulation to the parties.
Subject to the requirement of a negotiated consensus, the rules
produced will then be routinely enforced by the legal system
through the agency of the ordinary courts. By conferring
autonomy upon the parties to devise their own regulation,
private law achieves considerable ﬂexibility, which in turn
achieves the advantage that the regulation permits
experimentation with novel types of business transaction that
might enhance productive eﬃciency. But the greatest potential
advantage of reﬂexive law is the way in which it permits the
subjects of regulation, in this instance the parties to a contract,
to express their expectations of the relationship in their own
language, so that their private regulation minimises any
distortion of communication that might be imposed by a
regulatory framework.75
The hybrid judging that he advocates would not routinely
enforce the agreement of the parties because, as we have seen, a
judge giving eﬀect to hybrid law would examine the social and
economic context of the transaction as well as his or her
understanding of the relationship between the parties to decide
what the contract meant and how the dispute would be settled, in
other words, doing exactly what Collins would not want them to
do on the evidence of the just quoted passage. Collins’ praise for
the regulatory advantages of contract depends on the courts
applying what the parties have agreed to in a formalistic manner.
Once the courts move away from this formalistic approach, they
will run the risk of the very distortion of communication that
Collins highlights by replacing the parties’ own careful attempts to
craft language to give eﬀect to their expectations with the distorted
understanding of a judge. The advantage that private law has as a
75 Regulating Contracts, p. 67 (emphasis added).
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regulatory tool for contract is, as Collins so clearly describes,
dependent on the judges applying the agreement of the parties as
they have expressed it, and not by what will inevitably be ham-
ﬁsted attempts to second-guess what the parties meant. If, as
Collins asserts, the ‘‘reﬂexive character of private law regulation
works best when the parties negotiate the terms of the contract’’,76
surely this must mean that judges should give eﬀect to what the
parties have agreed to in a contract, i.e., formalistic judging. If
Collins is right about the regulatory advantages of private law,
these advantages will only accrue if the judges ignore his call for
hybrid law.
Collins goes on to argue that the nature of modern contracting,
especially in transactions such as long-term supply agreements,
franchise agreements and employment relationships in a career
hierarchy, demands a new role for judges in contract disputes.
The legal response to these new economic institutional
arrangements can be found in part in specialised statutory
interventions . . . but also in shifts towards the use of more
open-ended general clauses for regulating the content of
contractual obligations, and the toleration of a higher degree
of informality in the creation and modiﬁcation of contractual
duties.77
The classic example of such standards is good faith.78 Two recent
studies of good faith in long-term supply contracts and franchise
agreements suggest that Collins is wrong here. Both studies
emphasise that free-wheeling attempts by judges to impose what is
perceived to be a good faith standard of behaviour is economically
questionable and often runs counter the parties’ interests and
desires.79 Goldberg says that the courts have used good faith as a
‘‘blunt instrument’’80 for the protection of parties in long-term
supply contracts and that, while he looked more deeply into the
economics of these transactions than had the courts, ‘‘the moral of
the exercise is that courts should look even less’’81 than they do
now.
Another example of the commercial unsuitability of hybrid
judging arises in Collins’ discussion of the lessons to be learned
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 199.
78 Ibid.
79 V. Goldberg, ‘‘Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in Good Faith’’
(2002) 35 University of California, Davis, Law Review 319; J. Paterson, ‘‘Good Faith in
Commercial Contracts? A Franchising Case Study’’ (2001) 29 Australian Business Law Review
270. See also Collins, ‘‘Discretionary Powers in Contracts’’ in Campbell, Implicit Dimensions of
Contract, p. 232 where he discusses the failure of legislation to protect franchisees and the
negative impact that this legislation has had on economic activity in this sector.
80 Goldberg, ‘‘Reining in Good Faith’’, at p. 321.
81 Ibid., p. 323.
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from the legal history of two types of ﬁnancial transaction:
negotiable instruments and futures contracts.82 According to
Collins, these provided such intractable problems for the legal
system ‘‘that private law has proved incapable of providing any
productive assistance in the construction or regulation of these
transactions, and that the legal system as a whole is almost
irrelevant to these trading relations’’.83 But, clearly the non-legal
sanctions and trust associated with these transactions were more
than adequate to satisfy their regulatory needs so that they could
ﬂourish. The lesson to be learned here is not that a hybrid law is
somehow necessary for the eﬃcient operation of the market—in
these two cases it was not needed at all. Rather, the lesson is that
it is likely that law should be a fairly unobtrusive addition to non-
legal sanctions and trust. Collins’ hybrid law, by contrast, assumes
that the role of law should be to actively try to ape commercial
practice and give eﬀect to commercial expectations. Collins seems
to ignore the lesson that an examination of negotiable instruments
and futures contracts should teach us about the role of the law in
commerce more generally.
Collins’ discussion of power in what he calls symbiotic
relationships raises further doubts about the utility of his hybrid
law project. The problem that he discusses is a familiar one and is
frequently present in franchise agreements, for example, where one
party, normally the franchisor, may be given discretion to terminate
the relationship. Should this power be open to regulation by judges,
especially as it often seems that there is a power imbalance between
the parties? A judge applying a hybrid of law, economics and the
sociology of business would presumably say yes. However, Collins
is alert to the subtleties of contracting in such situations. He
accepts that it is impossible for a judge to decide whether such a
power is being used opportunistically or in good faith. He further
concedes that legislation is the best way to regulate this potential
problem. In other words, Collins wisely ignores his own general
thesis as a solution to the problems that he knows may arise in
such contracts.
The problem for legal regulation in such cases is that the
distinction between opportunism and a permissible exercise of
contractual discretionary power cannot be delineated by formal
tests. In a franchise relation, for instance, the franchisor may
enjoy the power to terminate the franchise at its discretion.
The reason for the insertion of such a clause is that the criteria
by which the franchisor makes such a business decision cannot
82 Regulating Contracts, ch. 9, pp. 202–222.
83 Ibid., p. 202.
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be reduced to simple formula . . . . The problem at the heart of
interpretation of this contractual relation is that two rival and
incommensurable expectations supply its meaning.84
By this stage Collins has accepted that what would appear to be
one-sided contracts may in fact be more balanced than a
concentration on the formal contract terms would suggest.85 The
balance is provided by the nature of the economic incentives in the
transaction and relationship. Crucially, Collins recognises that the
courts will not be in a position to distinguish between opportunistic
and economically appropriate use of such contract terms and that,
if the economic incentives do not operate satisfactorily, legislation is
the best means of regulation. In other words, hybrid judging is
neither possible nor useful in regulating such contracts.
In his conclusion to the discussion of the regulation of power in
contracts, Collins attempts to retrieve something from the wreckage
by repeating his call for a hybrid law that is ‘‘tailored precisely to
each type of economic relation, so that it can respond to the
exigencies of eﬃciency in diﬀerent types of transactions’’.86
Unfortunately his perceptive analysis of power in contractual
settings is based on insights that are inconsistent with his call for a
hybrid form of contract law.
From the examples outlined above it can be seen that we believe
that Collins himself provides good reasons for believing that
formalism would be far preferable to his proposed hybrid law if the
aim of the exercise is to have a type of law which best suits the
needs of those in the market.87 Amongst other commentators the
matter is still one for debate, but a reading of some of the more
important recent contributions suggests to us that the arguments in
favour of formalism have reached a position where the onus lies on
those opposing it to show that any alternative is superior.88
84 Ibid., pp. 243–244. See also H. Collins, ‘‘Discretionary Powers in Contracts’’ in Campbell,
Implicit Dimensions of Contract, 219 at pp. 226–232 where he explains the ‘‘powerful’’
economic arguments against judicial interference with contracts agreed to in the market.
85 H. Collins, ‘‘Discretionary Powers in Contracts’’, in Campbell, Implicit Dimensions of Contract,
at p. 251 where he notes that a willingness to accept a discretionary power in the other party
may act as a signalling device to further trust in the relationship.
86 Regulating Contracts, p. 254.
87 Further examples have been omitted for reasons of length but interested readers might want
to consider Collins’ recognition of the importance of security devices at p. 102, letters of
comfort at pp. 152–153, and standard form contracting at pp. 230–232 and how each of these
valuable commercial devices can only operate in a formalistic manner. All references are to
Regulating Contracts.
88 See, for example, L. Bernstein, ‘‘The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study’’ (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Review 710; L.
Bernstein, ‘‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions’’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724; R. Scott, ‘‘The
Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law’’ in J. Kraus and S. Walt (eds.), The Jurisprudential
Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law (Cambridge 2000), 149.
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CONCLUSION
Hugh Collins’ project of creating a hybrid form of contract law to
further the economic eﬃciency of the marketplace does not
convince. In fact, its failure was almost inevitable given that this
project is at odds with the careful and illuminating analysis that he
himself provides about the nature of market transacting and the
role of contract law in it.
Collins’ discussion of the relationship between law on the one
hand and the discourses of economics and sociology on the other
fails to take into account the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between a form
of practice (law) and academic and policy discourses (economics
and sociology). His discussion of the autonomy of law fails to
explain how law is to maintain its mandated autonomy and to
what extent it should be penetrated by the policy discourses he
favours. His treatment of the so-called closure rules is unpersuasive
because it fails to recognise the costs, material and jurisprudential,
that the changes to those rules would generate. His discussion of
the relationship between regulation and law is disappointing
because his understanding of regulation is so all-encompassing that
it obscures very real diﬀerences between common law and public
regulation and the costs involved in a general merger of the two.
His claims that a hybrid law would have the capacity for reﬂexive
learning and that the results of case law can be disseminated widely
enough to inﬂuence market players are also unpersuasive. While
none of these criticisms is necessarily fatal for his project, the
cumulative eﬀect is to raise serious doubts about the plausibility of
a hybrid law. But our other criticisms do go to the heart of his
project.
Collins’ project fails because it demands of judges skills and
knowledge that no human could muster. Judges will not be able to
do what he wants of them. His project fails because the
information that his proposed hybrid law needs is not available in
the easily accessible form that is required. In fact, there is a real
doubt whether it exists at all. Finally, it fails because he himself
shows that even if it could be made to work, it would be counter-
productive.
Yet as we step back from the immediate failures of Regulating
Contracts, we must acknowledge its important contributions to
contract scholarship. We have noted repeatedly in this paper that
Collins’ treatment of contract law and practice is rich in important
insights. At a broader level, though, it is its very failure which is its
most important contribution to contracts scholarship. Collins’
instinct that something had to be done to respond to the empirical
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work that shows the peripheral, indeed, sometimes harmful, role of
contact law in the marketplace was absolutely right. But his
exploration of what is perhaps the most obvious avenue of
response, ‘‘well, then let’s make it useful’’, demonstrates that this
path is a dead-end. His recognition that the empirical work
required a response stands in stark contrast to traditional scholars
who write traditional articles and books about contract law. While
we ultimately agree that this is what they should do and that theirs
is an important task, they themselves have failed to justify their
work in light of the empirical ﬁndings that drove Collins. It is a
nice irony that Collins’ failure rescues traditional contract scholars
by showing that the ‘‘obvious’’ response to the empirical studies,
one which by-passes their work, goes nowhere.
This is why we suggest that because of its failure to support its
project, Regulating Contracts is a success. Collins’ productive
failure89 shows that the obvious and popular response to the
empirical reality of contract’s place in the market cannot work.
Collins’ most important achievement is to show that the most
sophisticated argument for an activist judiciary that openly
manipulates the law to further the economic eﬃciency of the
market cannot work. This achievement matters because it frees
scholars to engage in more fruitful explorations of the role and
trajectory of contract law today.
89 Although one should use analogies from science with care we cannot resist comparing Collins’
failure to the famous Michelson-Morley experiment on the supposed ether which enveloped
the Earth. Their experiment ‘‘failed’’ because the ether did not exist. The experiment’s failure
was its success because it showed that the speed of light in a vacuum was independent of the
relative motion of the observer which, in turn, become one of the foundations of the theory
of relativity. A. Bullock and O. Stallybrass (eds.), The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought
(London 1977), pp. 388–389.
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